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FILLING THE GAP: 
ADDRESSING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF 
NORTH DAKOTA ADOPTING LEGISLATION CREATING 
A NEW ENTITY— 
THE LOW PROFIT LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article demonstrates that North Dakota law should be amended to 
bridge the gap between for-profit and nonprofit organizations by recog-
nizing the low profit limited liability company.  Part II of this article ana-
lyzes the flaws surrounding the current business sector and nonprofit sector 
and discusses why there is a need for hybridization.  This discussion in-
cludes a review of a for-profit’s duty to maximize profits and nonprofits’ 
limited access to capital and spending regulations.  Part III of this article 
explains the low profit limited liability company structure and examines the 
new entity’s uses or proposed uses in other states.  Finally, part IV 
describes the specific changes necessary to introduce the low profit limited 
liability company into North Dakota law and discusses why the North 
Dakota Legislature should adopt the legislation originally proposed to the 
Sixty-first Legislative Assembly in 2009. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In a 2007 commencement speech, Bill Gates challenged Harvard 
graduates to develop a more creative capitalism.1  He sought to persuade the 
graduates to “stretch the reach of market forces so that more people can 
make a profit, or at least make a living, serving people who are suffering 
from the worst inequities.”2  Challenging one to make a profit while 
 
1. Bill Gates, Keynote Address at the Harvard Commencement Ceremony for the Harvard 
University Class of 2007 (June 7, 2007), available at http://www.academicapparel.com/c-aps/bill-
gates-speech.html. 
2. Id. 
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achieving a social mission is no small task under today’s legal system.3  
Organizational structures do not facilitate the overlap of social benefits and 
profit-making because there is a divided three sector system:  business, non-
profit, and government.4 
Many critics believe the gap between the for-profit entities and the 
nonprofit entities can be exploited to create a fourth sector.5  A hybrid 
social enterprise organization is one arguable solution to utilize the fourth 
sector.6  Although there are several proposed hybrid structures, one in par-
ticular provides a great deal of promise:  the low profit limited liability 
company.7  The low profit limited liability company, known as the L3C, has 
been described as a for-profit entity with a nonprofit soul.8  With the hopes 
of positive social benefits on the horizon, the L3C “appears to be the tool 
best adapted to give legal standing and structure to its hybrid social 
enterprises.”9 
In 2009, a bill was introduced to the North Dakota Legislature that 
would have effectively created the statutory structure necessary to form an 
L3C.10  After the legislature discovered more questions than answers, 
House Bill 1545 was amended “to provide for a legislative council study 
relating to the feasibility and desirability of creating . . . [the] low-profit 
limited liability company.”11  The amended bill was passed on April 8, 
2009, and the findings and recommendations were to be reported back to 
the Sixty-Second Legislative Assembly in 2011.12 
This article demonstrates North Dakota law should be amended to 
bridge the gap between for-profit and nonprofit organizations by recog-
nizing the L3C.13  Part II of this article discusses the for-profit and non-
profit sectors by examining the flaws in our current legal system and why 
 
3. See infra Part II.A-B (describing the issues that make it difficult to reconcile the for-profit 
bottom line with the nonprofit bottom line). 
4. Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. 
REV. 337, 340 (2009). 
5. Id. 
6. Id. at 339. 
7. Id. at 342. 
8. Robert Lang, The L3C & Economic Development, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVEL-
OPMENT, http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/L3CAndEconomic 
Development.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2010). 
9. Kelley, supra note 4, at 377. 
10. H.R. 1545, 61st Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2009) (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009). 
11. Id. (as passed by House, Feb. 5, 2009). 
12. Id. (enacted). 
13. See infra Part IV.B (explaining how the L3C could stretch North Dakota foundations’ 
qualifying distributions to reach more people and how the L3C could potentially bring more 
capital into North Dakota to serve a social purpose). 
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there is a need for hybridization.14  Part III explains the L3C structure and 
examines the L3C’s uses or proposed uses in other states.15  Lastly, Part IV 
describes the specific changes necessary to introduce the L3C into North 
Dakota law and discusses why the North Dakota Legislature should adopt 
the legislation originally proposed to the Sixty-First Legislative Assembly 
on January 19, 2009.16 
North Dakota’s current legal structure draws a line between for-profit 
entities and nonprofit entities.17  The following section analyzes the issues 
raised as a result of the divided for-profit and nonprofit sectors.18  Part II 
specifically discusses how these issues negatively impact growth in 
businesses driven by a social mission.19 
II. THE CURRENT THREE SECTOR LEGAL SYSTEM AND THE 
NEED FOR HYBRIDIZATION 
Under North Dakota law, corporations or limited liability companies 
may be formed as for-profit entities or nonprofit entities.20  It is the desire to 
operate between these two entities that has sparked the development of hy-
brid organizations.21  An inability to form a hybrid structure forces an indi-
vidual to choose between a financial bottom line and a social bottom line.  
This section explores the polarized financial and social bottom lines the 
hybrid organizations seek to join.22  The section begins by focusing on the 
conflict between an entity’s fiduciary responsibilities and its desire to fur-
ther a social mission.23  Section B examines specific problems faced by 
 
14. See infra Part II.A-B (evaluating the conflicting ideals of maximizing profit and 
achieving a social purpose and discussing the hardships of forming a nonprofit organization). 
15. See infra Part III.A-B (describing the L3C structure, its functions, and benefits, and 
examining how it has been used in Vermont, Illinois, and the Crow Indian Nation). 
16. See infra Part IV.A-B (suggesting an amendment to the North Dakota Limited Liability 
Act and noting how the changes could potentially affect the State of North Dakota). 
17. Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-01(16) (2009) (defining corporation), and § 10-32-
02(38) (defining limited liability company), with § 10-33-01(9) (defining nonprofit corporation), 
and § 10-36-02(2) (defining nonprofit limited liability company). 
18. See infra Part II.A-B (analyzing how the current legal structure inhibits certain for-profit 
ventures from accomplishing a social aim and inhibits certain nonprofits from gaining access to 
capital). 
19. See infra Part II.A-B (discussing how the different ideals of the for-profit and nonprofit 
sectors create an underinvested class of business that provides a social benefit). 
20. See N.D. CENT CODE §§ 10-19.1-01, 10-32-02(38), 10-33-01(9), 10-36-02(2). 
21. See Michael D. Gottesman, From Cobblestones to Pavement:  The Legal Road Forward 
for the Creation of Hybrid Social Organizations, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 345, 345 (2007) 
(stating the for-profit and nonprofit sectors are recently attempting to “converge upon the middle 
ground”). 
22. See Kelley, supra note 4, at 339-40. 
23. See infra Part II.A (explaining that the duty of loyalty owed to the interest holders of the 
business makes the maximization of profits the predominant business purpose). 
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service organizations and grant-making foundations as a result of organ-
izing as a nonprofit.24 
A. FOR-PROFIT’S DUTY TO MAXIMIZE PROFIT 
Most for-profit structures have a primary goal of accumulating as much 
profit as they can for those holding an interest in the entity.25  Success is 
measured on the return of the investment as opposed to an entity’s social 
benefit.26  A conflict arises, however, when the business wants to pursue a 
social mission.27  The issues become whether an entity’s obligation to maxi-
mize the interest holders’ profit restricts the business’s direction and 
whether there is a disincentive to engage in socially beneficial activities. 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,28 a 1919 Michigan Supreme Court decision, 
provides a prime example of how the for-profit structure limits an entity’s 
ability to pursue a social mission.29  In Dodge, Henry Ford sought to reduce 
the price of his cars by eighty dollars, which, in turn, reduced Ford Motor 
Company’s annual profit by $48,000,000.30  Ford further stated his ambi-
tion was “to employ still more men, to spread benefits of this industrial 
system to the greatest possible number, [and] to help them build up their 
lives and their homes.”31  The plaintiffs contended Henry Ford was running 
Ford Motor Company as a “semi-eleemosynary institution”32 as opposed to 
a “business institution.”33  The court concluded a “business corporation is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.”34  
Thus, Ford’s ability to provide a social benefit to others was limited by the 
corporation’s bottom line, the obligation to maximize profit for the 
shareholders.35 
 
24. See infra Part II.B (explaining that service organizations are unable to achieve significant 
profits and investments and that grant-making foundations’ spending is regulated to only exempt 
purposes). 
25. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 346, 350 (citing Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm:  A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1423, 1423 (1993)). 
26. See Kelley, supra note 4, at 362 (citing ALLEN R. BROMBERGER, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE:  
A LAWYER’S PERSPECTIVE 5 (2007)). 
27. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 351. 
28. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919). 
29. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 350 n.21 (citing Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683). 
30. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. 
31. Id. 
32. “Eleemosynary” means “of, relating to, or supported by charity.”  MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S 
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 587 (Deluxe ed. 1998). 
33. Dodge, 170 N.W. at 683. 
34. Id. at 684. 
35. See id. 
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The fear of being sued for failing to maximize profits and for breaching 
one’s duty of loyalty clearly creates a disincentive to engage in socially 
beneficial activities with an increased risk.36  Beyond the duty to maximize 
profits, the tax code does little to encourage for-profit ventures to engage in 
charitable activities.37  An individual may deduct a charitable gift up to 
either thirty percent or fifty percent of his taxpayer contribution base; yet, a 
corporation may only deduct gifts up to ten percent of its taxable income.38  
Accordingly, the tax code does little to entice a business entity to achieve a 
charitable purpose.39 
The discussion in this section is not advocating that there is anything 
wrong with the legitimate motive to maximize profits.  From a for-profit 
perspective, however, the duty to maximize profit, coupled with the tax 
code, places social goals and charitable actions at opposite ends of the busi-
ness sector.  Thus, the current state of business structures generates a need 
for an entity that can bring together the profit motive with the desire to 
achieve a social mission.  The next section shifts the emphasis from the for-
profit perspective to the nonprofit perspective. 
B. VIEWING THE GAP FROM THE NONPROFIT PERSPECTIVE 
At the same time, nonprofit organizations also face challenges that hy-
bridization seeks to redress.40  Whereas a for-profit entity’s primary focus is 
the maximization of profit, a nonprofit’s focus is purely on charitable goals 
and a social mission.41  This section focuses on the gaps created in the non-
profit sector as a result of separating each sector’s bottom line.42 
There are two kinds of nonprofit organizations:  (1) service organiza-
tions and (2) grant-making foundations.43  Grant-making foundations raise 
money and distribute that money to service organizations.44  Service 
organizations, in turn, spend money to support a social mission.45  Both 
 
36. See id. at 683-84 (holding Ford Motor Co. is a business corporation whose primary 
purpose is to maximize profit). 
37. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 350-51. 
38. Id. at 351 n.23 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 170(b)(1)(A)-(B), (b)(2) (2000)). 
39. See id. at 351. 
40. Kelley, supra note 4, at 346, 353-54. 
41. Id. at 353 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(1)(ii) (2008) (“prohibiting tax-exempt 
public charities from distributing profits to equity investors”)) (stating that nonprofits exist to 
benefit the public); Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act §§ 1.40, 13.01 (1987) (“prohibiting 
payments under model state law from nonprofit corporations to their ‘members, directors, or 
officers’”). 
42. See infra Part II.B (explaining how restrictions are placed on nonprofits that prevent 
access to capital through profit, investors, and investing). 
43. Kelley, supra note 4, at 347. 
44. Id. at 347-48. 
45. Id. at 348. 
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grant-making foundations and service organizations, nevertheless, possess 
disadvantages when compared to for-profit businesses.46 
Service organizations have a distinct problem gaining access to capi-
tal.47  For example, to be tax-exempt as a nonprofit, the organization “must 
be both organized and operated exclusively for one or more exempt pur-
poses.”48  Although engaging in socially beneficial activities is an exempt 
purpose, the pursuit of profit generally is not.49  Even after securing tax-
exempt status, a service organization can still be taxed on profits that origi-
nated from “trade or business regularly carried out and not substantially 
related to the performance of an organization’s exempt purposes.”50  Fur-
thermore, service organizations cannot distribute profits, and, thus, cannot 
raise capital by attracting investors who may be looking for a financial 
return.51  As a result of these restrictions, service organizations have limited 
access to capital.52 
Whereas the predominant issue with service organizations is their 
limited access to capital, a foundation’s overarching problem is regulated 
spending.53  Through the fear of an excise tax, grant-making foundations 
are discouraged from investing “any amount in such a manner as to jeop-
ardize the carrying out of any of its exempt purposes.”54  To maintain a tax 
exempt status, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) mandates most founda-
tions and charitable trusts to make grants and/or have operating expendi-
tures equaling at least five percent of their prior year’s average net asset 
value.55  Grant-making foundations, therefore, are essentially restricted to 
investing only in nonprofit organizations.56  However, in 1969, Congress 
created an exception and recognized that foundations and charitable trusts 
 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 344 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (2008)). 
49. Id. at 345; Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity:  A Historical Analysis of 
America’s Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2437-83 (2005). 
50. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 348 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 513 (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1 
(2007)). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 347. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 349 n.18 (citing I.R.C. § 4944(a)(1)-(2) (2007)). 
55. Robert M. Lang, Jr., The L3C:  The New Way to Organize Socially Responsible and 
Mission Driven Organizations, SN036 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 251, 254 (2007); Jim Witkin, The L3C:  A 
More Creative Capitalism, TRIPLE PUNDIT, Jan. 15, 2009, http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/01/ 
the-l3c-a-more-creative-capitalism/. 
56. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 350. 
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could meet the five percent requirement by making program related 
investments.57 
A program related investment (PRI) is a foundation or a trust’s invest-
ment, such as purchasing an ownership interest or making a loan, in a chari-
table project or activity that furthers the foundation’s exempt purposes.58  A 
key difference is that the charitable project or activity may be a for-profit 
business.59  PRIs have the potential to benefit nonprofits because the invest-
ments can generate income or appreciate in value.60  On the other hand, if a 
foundation simply makes grants, there is no potential for the investment to 
generate income or appreciate in value.61 
In order to qualify as a PRI, the investment must meet three require-
ments: 
(i) the primary purpose of the investment is to accomplish one or 
more of the purposes described in section 170(c)(2)(B); (ii) no 
significant purpose of the investment is the production of income 
or the appreciation of property; and (iii) no purpose of the invest-
ment is to accomplish one or more of the purposes described in 
section 170(c)(2)(D).62 
A PRI may take the form of a purchase of stock or other equity security, a 
low interest loan or an interest free loan, a guaranty or a letter of credit, or 
even a low cost lease.63  Unfortunately, nonprofits are reluctant to make 
PRIs because they fear the IRS will find that the investment in the for-profit 
 
57. Rebecca H. Dent, PRI, MRI, SRI, L3C—A Short Review for Private Foundation Counsel, 
19 OHIO PROB. L.J. 137, 137 (2009); Lang, supra note 55, at 254. 
58. Lang, supra note 55, at 254. 
59. Id. 
60. The Mary Elizabeth & Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation Inc., Presentation Workshop 
C-3 at the UBS Philanthropy Forum, The L3C:  The For Profit with a Nonprofit Soul, (July 5, 
2007), available at http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/L3CUBS 
Presentation.pdf.  Any gains on the PRI must be given away through the foundation’s usual 
procedures or must reinvest the PRIs within one year of receipt. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. 26 C.F.R. § 53.4944-3 (2008).  Section 170(c)(2)(B) states: 
[A] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . organized and 
operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational 
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if 
no part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for 
the prevention of cruelty to children or animals. 
26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2008).  Section 170(c)(2)(D) states: 
[A] corporation, trust, or community chest, fund, or foundation . . . which is not 
disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to 
influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the 
publishing or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in 
opposition to) any candidate for public office. 
26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(D) (2008). 
63. Lang, supra note 55, at 254. 
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organization did not further the foundation’s goals.64  If the investment is 
found not to qualify as a PRI, the nonprofit will be subject to an excise 
tax.65  Moreover, the foundations have the responsibility to evaluate and 
monitor the organization receiving the investment.66 
To avoid being subject to the excise tax, foundations have the option of 
seeking a private letter ruling from the IRS.67  Private letter rulings, how-
ever, have proven to not only be costly, but also time consuming.68  Private 
letter rulings can potentially take six to eight months to process.69  The IRS 
also charges a fee of $8700, and the high legal costs and fees could rise to 
anywhere from $25,000 to $50,000.70  Because of the PRIs’ uncertainty and 
because PRIs are characterized as cumbersome, foundations choose to 
make grants as opposed to investing in for-profit ventures.71  In fact, only 
five percent of foundations actually designate PRIs.72 
The for-profit and nonprofit sectors have been separated by their 
unique bottom lines.73  However, separating these organizations in the cur-
rent legal system limits potential social entrepreneurship that could arise if 
not for the limited access to capital or the duty to maximize profit.74  There 
has been a recent push to cure this defect though the creation of hybrid 
organizations.75  Part III not only discusses the L3C, a promising hybrid 
structure, but also provides information on other states using the L3C or 
proposing to use the L3C.76 
 
64. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 350. 
65. Id. 
66. Jane M. Searing, Capital With a Conscience:  Private Foundations Must Distinguish 
Carefully Their Investments’ Purpose, Character and Strategy, J. ACCT., July 2008, available at 
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2008/Jul/Capital-WithaConscience (stating “[p]ri-
vate foundations must observe expenditure responsibility (ER) rules governing PRIs or grants 
made to an entity that is not a qualified public charity under IRC § 501(c)(3)”). 
67. Lang, supra note 55, at 254. 
68. Bruce D. Collins, L3C Designation Allows Foundations to Support Businesses Working 
for the Public Good, INSIDE COUNSEL, Jan. 2, 2008, http://www.insidecounsel.com/Issues/2008/ 
January%202008/Pages/LowProfits.aspx. 
69. Lang, supra note 55, at 255. 
70. Collins, supra note 68; Lang, supra note 55, at 255. 
71. Witkin, supra note 55. 
72. Sally Duros, L3Cs:  For-Profit Financing with a Soul, COMMUNITY MEDIA WORKSHOP, 
http://communitymediaworkshop.org/newnews/2009/06/l3cs-for-profit-%E2%80%A8financing 
%E2%80%A8with-a-soul/ (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
73. See supra Part II.A-B. 
74. See supra Part II.A-B. 
75. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 345; Kelley, supra note 4, at 339. 
76. See infra Part III.A-B (discussing the characteristics of the L3C and observing the L3C’s 
adoption into laws of the State of Vermont, the State of Illinois, and the Crow Indian Nation). 
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III. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THE FOR-PROFIT AND THE 
NONPROFIT SECTORS 
In 1977, Wyoming passed the first limited liability company (LLC) 
legislation.77  After a 1988 IRS Revenue Ruling that acknowledged LLCs 
would be taxed as partnerships, LLC legislation swept the nation.78  In 
1993, North Dakota embraced the new entity by passing the North Dakota 
Limited Liability Company Act.79  It would, therefore, not be extraordinary 
for North Dakota to follow the same path regarding an entity that could 
bridge the gap between for-profit and nonprofit entities if such an entity 
was accepted by the IRS.80  The following section explores the characteris-
tics of an L3C as a hybrid organization and offers a glimpse of the L3C’s 
applications in other states.81 
A. ANALYZING THE L3C AND THE PURPOSE FOR CREATING SUCH 
AN ENTITY 
Today’s legal system polarizes for-profit and nonprofit organizations.82  
On the one hand, the only for-profit businesses that are attractive as invest-
ment vehicles are those with high profit returns and low risk.83  On the other 
hand, there are those businesses that do not make a profit and can only sur-
vive as a government entity or nonprofit entity.84  Although this observation 
oversimplifies today’s business environment, it illustrates the gap between 
for-profit entities and nonprofit entities that is underinvested.85  The current 
for-profit structure requests a higher financial return than most social mis-
sion businesses can ordinarily provide.86  The current nonprofit structures, 
meanwhile, are inhibited by their inability to gain access to capital.87  Con-
sequently, it becomes difficult to bring a profit motive and a social mission 
together.  An inability to bridge this gap discourages social innovation and 
 
77. Heather M. Field, Checking in on “Check-the-Box”, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 460 
(2009). 
78. Garry A. Pearson, The North Dakota Limited Liability Company Act:  Formation and 
Tax Consequences, 70 N.D. L. REV. 67, 70 (1994). 
79. Id. 
80. See id. 
81. See infra Part III.A-B (discussing the L3C’s flexible membership structure that allows for 
tranching and flow-through taxation, as well as the L3C’s development in the State of Vermont, 
the State of Illinois, and the Crow Indian Nation). 
82. See supra Part II.A-B. 
83. Lang, supra note 55, at 253. 
84. Id. at 253, 261. 
85. Id. at 253. 
86. Id. 
87. Witkin, supra note 55. 
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inhibits investments that have an underlying social motive.88  This section 
examines the L3C structure and explains how the new entity fills the gap 
between the for-profit and nonprofit organizations.89 
Robert Lang, the Chief Executive Officer of the Mary Elizabeth & 
Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation, Inc., recognized the problem discussed 
above and created the L3C as a possible solution.90  Marcus Owens, a 
Washington, D.C. tax attorney, furthered the idea by writing the law that 
created the L3C.91  Spun off of the LLC, the L3C is a new entity “designed 
to attract a wide range of investment sources thereby improving the 
viability of social ventures.”92  The L3C is a for-profit entity with a double 
bottom line because its primary objective is not to maximize profits, but to 
achieve a charitable or educational purpose.93  One major advantage the 
L3C has over the LLC is its ability to receive PRIs from private foundations 
without the foundation obtaining an IRS private letter ruling.94  Coupled 
with the ability to receive PRIs, the L3C retains the LLC’s flexible 
structure.95 
The L3C, like the LLC, may form flexible partnerships that allow 
ownership rights to be tailored to meet each partner’s requirements.96  The 
flexible membership structure allows for the creation of different classes of 
membership.97  The different classes of membership can also represent tiers 
 
88. See supra Part II.A-B (explaining how the polarized ideals of the for-profit and nonprofit 
sectors leave a portion of the business sector willing to receive lower profits to achieve a social 
gain underinvested). 
89. See infra Part III.A (explaining how the L3C’s unique characteristics allow it to have a 
financial and a social bottom line). 
90. Lang, supra note 55, at 253.  Robert Lang is an economist and a businessman.  Sally 
Duros, How to Save Newspapers, THE HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 9, 2009, available at http://www. 
huffingtonpost.com/sally-duros/how-to-save-newspapers_b_164849.html.  Lang contrived the 
L3C structure as a way “to address the problems he was having while trying to invest family 
foundation money in a sustainable and effective way.” Id. 
91. Witkin, supra note 55. 
92. The L3C:  Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, COMMUNITY WEALTH VENTURES, 
INC. (July 2008), http://communitywealth.org/pdf-doc/The%20L3C%20-%20The%20Low-Profit 
%20Limited%20Liability%20Company%20-%20CWV%20Brief%20-%20Updated.pdf; Witkin, 
supra note 55. 
93. Kelley, supra note 4, at 372. 
94. Supporting the Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, COUNCIL OF MICHIGAN FOUNDA-
TIONS, http://www.michiganfoundations.org/s_cmf/sec.asp?CID=6766&DID=14917 (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2011). 
95. Witkin, supra note 55. 
96. Id. 
97. Kelley, supra note 4, at 374. 
Social entrepreneurs could draft L3C membership agreements to create different 
classes of members, each with different rights and duties, and a particular member’s 
powers and duties would not have to correspond in any way with his or her ownership 
stake in the venture.  It would be a straightforward drafting exercise to create a special 
class of members empowered to enforce the organization’s social mission.  This 
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of capital investment.98  When there are different tiers of capital investment, 
the structure permits tranching or investment layering, where each invest-
ment layer has a tailored return and risk.99  The L3C takes advantage of 
tranched investing when a foundation invests in the equity of an L3C using 
the PRI.100  For example, the foundation takes the position of injecting 
capital for a very low rate of return or for no return at all because the foun-
dations are compensated through the L3C’s social outcomes.101  At the 
same time, the foundation also takes the higher risk position.102  The 
foundation, therefore, can be subordinate to the market investors using their 
PRIs and absorbing the higher risk.103 
Next, the L3C would likely have an intermediate tier that attracts 
investors willing to accept below-market returns in exchange for the social 
benefits.104  Meanwhile, the last tier is geared toward the market investors 
seeking lower risk investments with a potential rate of return that is closer 
to the market rate.105  This last equity tier, thus, can be marketed as a safer 
and more lucrative investment that still enables a social benefit.106  Essen-
tially, the L3C leverages a foundation’s PRIs to gain access to other 
investors that would not be willing to inject capital into the business with-
out the foundation absorbing the higher risk at a below-market return.107  
Tranched investing, therefore, gives L3Cs access to trillions of dollars from 
the private sector that would not otherwise be available to entities with a 
purely social mission.108  Using the L3C structure would allow either a for-
profit or nonprofit organization to achieve social goals more effectively by 
allowing for-profits to commit to a social mission without fear of breaching 
 
member, or members, could be a public charity or private foundation with only a 
minor financial stake in the venture—or none at all—but with the power to block other 
members from making changes to the organizational documents that would dilute its 
social mission. 
Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Witkin, supra note 55. 
100. The L3C:  Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, supra note 92. 
101. Kelley, supra note 4, at 373. 
102. Id. at 374. 
103. Witkin, supra note 55. 
104. Kelley, supra note 4, at 374. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Marc Lane, Part 4 of Social Enterprise Alliance Chicago Chapter’s Presentation on the 
L3C (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZ9uQmVvtjA&feature= 
related [hereinafter Lane Part 4]. 
108. The L3C:  Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, supra note 92. 
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a duty of loyalty and by making capital more readily accessible for 
nonprofits.109 
Lastly, the L3C’s flexible partnership structure also permits the L3C to 
be taxed like an LLC, meaning the L3C would have the election to be taxed 
as a corporation or as a partnership.110  It would most likely be taxed as a 
partnership; therefore, the L3C would have profits and losses flow through 
the entity to the members, who would respectively file a K-1, similar to the 
LLC.111  The L3C, thus, results in no specialized reporting.112  The charac-
teristics possessed by the L3C were strategically arranged to permit a dou-
ble bottom line, and the next section discusses certain states that have found 
it a worthwhile entity to adopt.113 
B. SURVEYING THE USE OF THE L3C IN OTHER STATES 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution 
permits L3Cs organized in a state that has passed L3C legislation to be 
recognized in all fifty states.114  Some states across the United States are 
nevertheless adopting their own L3C legislation.115  One does not need to 
look very far to find a comparable situation; for example, LLC legislation 
was originally introduced in the State of Wyoming in 1977.116  By 1996, 
nearly all the states had passed LLC legislation.117  The first L3C legislation 
was passed in 2008.118  Currently, there are seven states that have passed 
the legislation:  Vermont, Michigan, Wyoming, Utah, Illinois, Maine, and 
North Carolina.119 
 
109. Gottesman, supra note 21, at 346. 
110. Marc Lane, Part 5 of Social Enterprise Alliance Chicago Chapter’s Presentation on the 
L3C (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AZ9uQmVvtjA&feature= 
related. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. See infra Part III.B (describing how Vermont, Illinois, and the Crow Indian Nation have 
adopted the legislation). 
114.  The Mary Elizabeth & Gordon B. Mannweiler Foundation Inc., Presentation Workshop 
C-3 at the UBS Philanthropy Forum, The L3C:  The For Profit with a Nonprofit Soul, (July 5, 
2007), available at http://www.americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/downloads/L3CUBS 
Presentation.pdf.  
115. AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, http://www.americansforcommunity 
development.org/legislativewatch.php (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
116. Pearson, supra note 78, at 70. 
117. Larry E. Ribstein, A Critique of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 25 
STETSON L. REV. 311, 321 (1995). 
118. Searing, supra note 66. 
119. INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, http://www.intersectorl3c.com/home.html (last visited 
Jan. 6, 2011). 
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Section B examines how the L3C has been used in other jurisdictions 
and how some jurisdictions are proposing to use the L3C.120  The section 
begins by exploring the State of Vermont.121  Vermont was the first state to 
pass legislation introducing the L3C.122  This section also explores how 
Illinois has proposed to use the L3C.123  Specifically, Illinois has a unique 
problem with its newspaper industry.124  Certain individuals have turned to 
the L3C hoping to cure the injured newspaper industry.125  Lastly, this sec-
tion analyzes L3C legislation passed by a body other than a state:  the Crow 
Indian Nation.126  North Dakota is home to several Native American tribes, 
and examining why this tribe adopted such legislation is particularly rele-
vant to North Dakota.127 
1. Vermont 
On April 30, 2008, Vermont became the first state to pass legislation 
that created the new business entity, the L3C.128  The legislation was inten-
tionally written to dovetail Treasury Regulations section 53.4944-3 and was 
strategically placed to qualify all L3Cs as for-profit ventures eligible for 
PRIs.129  Lang and a few others were the first to create an L3C, called L3C 
 
120. See infra Part III.B (discussing Vermont, Illinois, and the Crow Indian Nation). 
121. See infra Part III.B.1 (examining Vermont’s L3C legislation and the various L3Cs that 
have been formed in the state, including CoolPass, L3C). 
122. Kelley, supra note 4, at 376 (citing H. 775, 2008 Gen. Assemb. (Vt. 2008)). 
123. See infra Part III.B.2 (explaining how Illinois has proposed to use the L3C structure in 
the struggling newspaper industry). 
124. See Duros, supra note 72. 
125. See id. 
126. See infra Part III.B.3 (outlining the Crow Indian Nation’s decision to adopt L3C 
legislation); A. Nicole Spooner, The Possibilities of the L3C, PROSKAUER (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://nonprofitlaw.proskauer.com/2009/11/articles/formation/the-possibilities-of-the-l3c/. 
127. NORTH DAKOTA INDIAN AFFAIRS COMMISSION, http://www.nd.gov/indianaffairs/?id= 
34&page=ND+Reservations (last visited Jan. 6, 2011) (listing Turtle Mountain Band of 
Chippewa, Three Affiliated Tribes:  Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation, Spirit Lake Nation, 
and Standing Rock Sioux Tribe). 
128. Witkin, supra note 55. 
129. The Concept of the L3C, AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, http://www. 
americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/concept.php (last visited Feb. 24, 2011) [hereinafter The 
Concept of the L3C].  Title 11 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated section 3001, subsection 27 was 
added and reads: 
“L3C” or “low-profit limited liability company” means a person organized under this 
chapter that is organized for a business purpose that satisfies and is at all times 
operated to satisfy each of the following requirements: 
(A) The company: 
(i) significantly furthers the accomplishment of one or more charitable or 
educational purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(B) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B); and 
(ii) would not have been formed but for the company’s relationship to the 
accomplishment of charitable or educational purposes. 
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Advisors, L3C.130  Today, more than one hundred L3Cs have been formed 
in the State of Vermont.131  A variety of L3Cs have been created, including 
“a chess camp, theater, alternative energy companies, publishers, food com-
panies and numerous consulting firms.”132  The Vermont Legislature is 
hoping to inform foundations and donor-directed funds that L3Cs formed 
under the statute propose to work to carry out their business in a way that 
would qualify as PRIs.133 
Another Vermont L3C that was created soon after legislation was 
passed is CoolPass, L3C.134  CoolPass was organized on July 2, 2008.135  
As discussed above, L3Cs must have a social mission.136  CoolPass’s social 
mission is to reduce the carbon footprint as a carbon offsetter program.137  
As a carbon offsettor, CoolPass purchases credits from other businesses 
scaling down their greenhouse gas emissions or engaging in renewable 
energy projects.138  The business turns around and markets those credits to 
individuals and businesses hoping to offset their carbon dioxide emis-
sions.139  CoolPass then permanently withdraws the credits from the avail-
able pool.140  The credit producers receive revenue from turning credits into 
 
(B) No significant purpose of the company is the production of income or the 
appreciation of property; provided, however, that the fact that a person produces 
significant income or capital appreciation shall not, in the absence of other 
factors, be conclusive evidence of a significant purpose involving the production 
of income or the appreciation of property. 
(C) No purpose of the company is to accomplish one or more political or legisla-
tive purposes within the meaning of Section 170(c)(2)(D) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986, 26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(D). 
(D) If a company that met the definition . . . at its formation at any time ceases to 
satisfy any one of the requirements, it shall immediately cease to be a low-profit 
limited liability company, but by continuing to meet all the other requirements of 
this chapter, will continue to exist as a limited liability company.  The name of 
the company must be changed to be in conformance . . . of this title. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (2008). 
130. Witkin, supra note 55. 
131. INTERSECTOR PARTNERS, L3C, supra note 119; Ann Meyer, New Corporate Structure 
Could Give Social Entrepreneurs New Funding Stream, CHICAGO TRIB., Aug. 10, 2009, 
http://archives.chicagotribune. com/2009/aug/10/business/chi-mon-minding-l3c-aug10. 
132. Id. 
133. Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, VERMONT SECRETARY OF STATE:  
CORPORATIONS DIVISION, http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/llc_l3c.htm (last visited Jan. 
6, 2011). 
134. Mission, COOLPASS, L3C, http://www.coolpass.com/c/mission/Our+Mission.html (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
135. Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, supra note 133. 
136. See supra Part III.A (explaining the L3C is formed to carry out one or more social 
missions). 
137. Mission, supra note 134. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
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offsets.141  The business, therefore, can create an incentive for emission re-
duction and renewable energy projects because they are no longer unprofit-
able.142  CoolPass attempts to use the L3C structure “to bring together a mix 
of foundations, trusts, endowments, investors, corporations, and govern-
ment in order to achieve [its] social objectives while operating according to 
for-profit metrics.”143 
CoolPass also helps low-income homeowners obtain “EnergyStar effi-
cient furnaces, hot water heaters, insulation and other home upgrades.”144  
CoolPass reduces the amount of aggregate energy used by low-income 
homeowners, which, in turn, reduces the amount of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, offsets greenhouse gases, and lowers energy costs of home-
owners.145  CoolPass’s “funding and distribution model provides the sus-
tainable[,] cooperative financial framework necessary to create the velocity 
to go beyond offsetting and retiring [g]reenhouse [g]as [e]missions.”146 
2. Illinois 
On August 4, 2009, Illinois Governor Pat Quinn signed a bill that 
amended Illinois’s Limited Liability Company Act to allow for the L3C’s 
creation.147  The Illinois Legislature hopes the law, which took effect on 
January 1, 2010, will spark an inflow of capital to social enterprises.148  
Illinois’ foundations have approximately $350 billion in assets.149  Because 
foundations are required to invest five percent of their assets to keep their 
tax-exempt status, $17 billion dollars is potentially available should founda-
tions choose to make PRIs in the L3Cs.150  Although there are a variety of 
L3C possibilities that could use this capital, there is one particular industry 
that hopes to use the L3C structure to take advantage of the foundations’ 
investment capital.151 
 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Lauren Thomas, L3C:  A Finance Model for Sustainable Development, VN JOURNAL 
(Jan. 24, 2010, 6:05 PM), http://www.vitanuova.net/journal/2010/01/l3c-a-finance-model-for-
sustainable-development.html. 
144. Sandy Pon, Have You Heard About the L3C Nonprofit:  For-Profit Hybrid?, 
FOUNDATION CENTER (July 2, 2009), http://atlantablog.foundationcenter.org/2009/07/have-you-
heard-about-the-l3c-nonprofit-forprofit-hybrid.html. 
145. See Mission, supra note 134. 
146. Id. 
147. AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, supra note 115. 
148. Meyer, supra note 131. 
149. See Duros, supra note 72. 
150. See id. 
151. See id. 
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Illinois is home to two notable newspapers that are suffering under the 
economic times:  The Peoria Journal Star and the Chicago Tribune.152  The 
newspaper industry’s hard times are evidenced by the growing number of 
newspaper publishers filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, such as the Tribune 
Co., which publishes the Chicago Tribune, the Sun Times Media Group, 
and the Journal Register Co.153  Lang suggests the L3C structure could 
potentially benefit this hurting industry.154  Specifically, Lang points out 
that the Peoria newspaper is making money.155  The profits, nevertheless, 
are not enough to sustain the newspaper.156  Lang and many others believe 
that under the L3C structure, the current profit would be sufficient because 
the newspaper would merely be a low-profit entity.157  Although the news-
paper industry may not be a high-profit venture, there is a social benefit in 
creating jobs and educating the public, and it is important to provide a 
structure for these businesses to flourish. 
3. Crow Indian Nation 
The Crow Indian Nation consists of approximately 11,000 members.158  
The Crow Indian Reservation is located at the southern edge of the State of 
Montana.159  Operating under its own tribal government and its own laws, 
the Crow Indian Nation is a sovereign nation separate from that of the 
state.160 
 
152. See id. 
153. Helen Deards, Newspaper Bankruptcy:  A Fresh Start or the Beginning of the End?, 
EDITORS WEBLOG (May 22, 2009), http://www.editorsweblog.org/newspaper/2009/05/ 
newspaper_bankruptcy_a_fresh_start_or_th.php. 
154. See Duros, supra note 72.  The L3C is merely a hypothetical solution for the newspaper 
industry at this time.  L3Cs are only open to those businesses “organized and operated exclusively 
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or inter-
national amateur sports competition . . . or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals.”  
26 U.S.C. § 170(c)(2)(B) (2006).  Thus, there is still a question as to whether a newspaper fulfills 
a charitable or an educational purpose.  Federal legislation attempts to cure the uncertainty by 
expanding the permissible social missions to include newspapers.  Leonard Jacobs, New Models: 
The Low-Profit Limited Liability Company, THE CLYDE FITCH REP., Mar. 13, 2009, http://www. 
clyde fitchreport.com/?p=1257; see Duros, supra note 90.  However, without passing this legisla-
tion, the Program-Related Investment Promotion Act, forming a newspaper L3C would be 
unlikely.  Duros, supra note 72 (quoting Jennifer Towery, Peoria Newspaper Guild President).  
But see Chicago’s L3C Newsroom, THE NONPROFIT ROAD (Oct. 23, 2009), http://journalism 
nonprofit.blogspot.com/2009/10/chicagos-l3c-newsroom.html (stating Chicago News Cooperative 
will begin as an L3C after January 1, 2010). 
155. See Duros, supra note 90. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. 
158. OFFICIAL SITE OF THE CROW TRIBE APSÁALOOKE NATION, http://www.crowtribe.com/ 
about.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2011). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
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Before the Tribe attempted to adopt the L3C legislation, the Crow 
Indian Nation had desired to engage in commerce with the surrounding fifty 
states.161  Accordingly, the Tribe adopted laws, such as foreclosure laws, 
providing commercial lenders with a remedy in the event of a default.162  
The Tribe also adopted the Uniform Commercial Code for general commer-
cial transactions.163  Finally, on January 13, 2009, the Crow Indian Nation 
adopted legislation creating the L3C.164 
The Crow Indian Nation viewed the L3C as a chance to develop 
economically.165  It was an opportunity to bring in foundation capital, 
which would successively attract private sector money.166  After obtaining 
the capital, ideally the business would then become successful at some 
point in the future, and the foundation could redeem its shares.167  By 
redeeming its shares, the foundation would get its capital back and could 
freely invest that money as it chose.168  Meanwhile, the Tribe would own 
the business outright.169  Thus, the Tribe could use the L3C structure to 
build tribal businesses with the help of a foundation’s investment and 
leverage private sector capital.  The Crow Indian Nation demonstrates how 
the L3C could effectively be used to boost a local economy, using the 
strengths of the L3C structure. 
IV. ENCOURAGING A SOCIAL MISSION IN NORTH DAKOTA 
North Dakota legislators have already been presented with a bill that 
sought to introduce the L3C, but failed to pass the legislation.170  This sec-
tion explores the necessary revisions to the North Dakota Century Code that 
would bring the L3C to life in North Dakota.171  In addition to examining 
how the North Dakota Legislature could effectively adopt language to 
create the L3C, this section discusses the most significant shortcoming 
 
161. Lane Part 4, supra note 107. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. 
164. AMERICANS FOR COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, supra note 115. 
165. Lane Part 4, supra note 107. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Compare H.R. 1545, 61st Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2009) (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009), 
with H.R. 1545 (as adopted, Apr. 8, 2009). 
171. See infra Part IV.A (elaborating on the language of the L3C legislation originally 
proposed to the North Dakota Legislature). 
          
2010] NOTE 553 
surrounding the L3C structure.172  The section focuses particularly on why 
North Dakota legislators should keep an open mind when faced with a new 
bill attempting to create the L3C.173 
A. OPENING THE DOORS TO A NEW LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY 
On January 19, 2009, North Dakota House Bill 1545 was introduced 
during the 2009 legislative session.174  The bill was introduced to amend the 
North Dakota Limited Liability Company Act.175  Because an L3C is not a 
nonprofit entity, but a for-profit entity with a nonprofit soul, the statute the 
bill sought to amend was the North Dakota Limited Liability Company Act, 
as opposed to the North Dakota Nonprofit Limited Liability Company 
Act.176  In fact, the L3C is merely a special kind of LLC.177  Thus, follow-
ing Vermont’s lead, North Dakota targeted the LLC Act.178 
To introduce the L3C, North Dakota need only amend a few para-
graphs of the existing Limited Liability Company Act.179  First, the defini-
tion of the L3C must be incorporated into the Limited Liability Company 
Act.180  The definition establishes that an L3C has a business purpose.181  
The business purpose language is important because it furthers the notion 
that an L3C is a for-profit entity; thus, the business does not achieve tax-
exempt status after filing the L3C articles of organization.182  The definition 
also includes the L3C requirements.183  The L3C requirements are unique 
because they mirror 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c), which aids the presumption of the 
L3C’s PRI eligibility.184  The L3C requirement language is extremely 
 
172. See infra Part IV.B (discussing how the optimism surrounding the L3C’s benefits to the 
foundations, businesses with a social mission, the public, and the North Dakota economy should 
not be forgotten in the face of the L3C’s uncertainty). 
173. Id. 
174. H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009). 
175. Id.  However, the bill was amended to a mere study of the L3C’s feasibility and 
desirability.  H.R. 1545 (as passed by House, Feb. 3, 2009). 
176. Kelley, supra note 4, at 372 n.177.  See generally H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 
2009) (stating the bill sought to amend North Dakota Century Code section 10-32-02). 
177. Marc Lane, Part 2 of Social Enterprise Alliance Chicago Chapter’s Presentation on the 
L3C (Aug. 4, 2009), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fgluytQQvq4&feature= 
related. 
178. See Limited Liability Companies Act, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (1995) (amended 
2007). 
179. See id. § 3001(27); see also H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009). 
180. See H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009). 
181. Id. 
182. Searing, supra note 66. 
183. See H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009). 
184. Compare H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009), with 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (2006), 
and 26 U.S.C § 170(c)(2)(B) (providing that investments where the primary purpose of which is to 
be “organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational 
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important because it preserves the L3C’s most unique attraction:  its status 
as a qualified recipient for PRIs.185  The L3C, however, must at all times 
satisfy the specified requirements to retain its qualifying status.186 
Next, the Limited Liability Company Act would also be amended to 
require all L3C businesses to include “low-profit limited liability com-
pany,” “L3C,” or “l3c” in the name of the business.187  Requiring busi-
nesses to include the L3C designation serves a dual purpose.  First, it puts 
foundations willing to make PRIs to for-profit ventures on notice that the 
business is eligible for those investments.188  Second, attaching “L3C” to 
the business name “signal[s] to . . . customers, employees, vendors, and 
[the] communit[y]” that the business achieves a charitable or educational 
purpose.189  House Bill 1545, as it was originally proposed, did not include 
the necessary language from 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) and 26 U.S.C. 
§ 170(c)(2)(B).190 
The language discussed above could all be found in the original version 
of North Dakota House Bill 1545.191  The bill, nevertheless, ignored the 
consequence of an L3C failing to satisfy the specified requirements.192  The 
Vermont L3C statute provides guidance on this defect.193  Vermont’s 
version of the statute states that if the business that files to be an L3C “at 
any time ceases to satisfy any one of the requirements, it shall immediately 
cease to be a low-profit limited liability company, but by continuing to meet 
all the other requirements of this chapter, will continue to exist as a limited 
liability company.”194  Thus, a L3C is merely a LLC with a special status, 
but the L3C can lose its special status by failing to meet the statutory 
requirements.195 
 
purposes, or to foster national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no part of its 
activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty 
to children or animals,” and where income production or appreciation of property is not a material 
purpose). 
185. Lang, supra note 55, at 254, 256. 
186. H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009). 
187. Id. (amending N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-10(1)(b)). 
188. Steve Davis & Sue Woodrow, The L3C:  A New Business Model For Socially 
Responsible Investing, COMMUNITY DIVIDEND (Nov. 2009), http://www.minneapolisfed.org/ 
publications_papers/pub_display.cfm?id=4305. 
189. Doug Bately, Low-Profit LLCs—The Newest Limited Liability Company Structure, 
STOEL RIVES LLP (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.llclawmonitor.com/2009/08/articles/ lowprofit-
llcs/lowprofit-llcs-the-newest-limited-liability-company-structure/. 
190. Compare H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009), with 26 U.S.C. § 4944(c) (2006), 
and 26 U.S.C § 170(c)(2)(B). 
191. See H.R. 1545 (as introduced, Jan. 19, 2009). 
192. See id. 
193. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 3001 (1995). 
194. Id. § 3001(27)(D). 
195. Id. 
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Together, these amendments to the Limited Liability Company Act will 
serve to bridge the gap between the for-profit and nonprofit sectors in North 
Dakota.  The next section will examine how the L3C could specifically 
benefit the State of North Dakota.196  Conversely, the section also addresses 
the most significant shortcoming attached to the L3C structure.197 
B. L3C IN NORTH DAKOTA 
House Bill 1545 as it was enacted seeks to study “the feasibility and 
desirability of creating . . . [the] low-profit limited liability company.”198  
This section first observes data regarding foundations and the State of North 
Dakota.199  The section continues by focusing on the potential benefits and 
uses the L3C would have in North Dakota, but also addresses the greatest 
problem that accompanies the L3C structure.200 
In 2007, North Dakota was home to less than one hundred founda-
tions.201  Those foundations made distributions totaling approximately $310 
million.202  The total amount of qualifying distributions that were made by 
these foundations in 2007 totaled an estimated $19,348,000.203  Qualifying 
distributions are those expenditures used in calculating the foundation’s re-
quired payout that includes “total giving, as well as reasonable administra-
tive expenses, set-asides, PRIs, operating program expenses, and [the] 
amount to acquire assets used directly for charitable purposes.”204  The 
roughly nineteen million dollars paid out by North Dakota foundations was 
the lowest total in the United States.205 
It could be argued L3C legislation should not be passed because North 
Dakota’s foundation assets do not produce a significant qualified distribu-
tions requirement.  However, the L3C can also be viewed as a way to 
increase North Dakota foundations’ distributions and a way to make their 
qualifying distributions go further.  For example, in 2007, roughly eight 
 
196. See infra Part IV.B (pointing out the benefits to North Dakota foundations, businesses 
with a social mission, and the public). 
197. See infra Part IV.B (addressing the uncertainty attached to the L3C created by the IRS’s 
silence). 
198. H.R. 1545, 61st Legis. Assemb. (N.D. 2009) (enacted). 
199. See infra Part IV.B (providing the number of foundations in North Dakota, their total 
asset values, and their qualifying distribution numbers). 
200. See infra Part IV.B (explaining the increased capital reaching ventures that provide a 
social benefit, but also discussing how the IRS’s silence on the L3C has created uncertainty with 
the L3C movement). 
201. Fiscal Data of Grantmaking by Region and State, 2007, FOUNDATION CENTER (2009), 
http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/statistics/pdf/01_found_fin_data/2007/01_07.pdf. 
202. Id. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
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million dollars were given out in the form of grants by North Dakota foun-
dations.206  Unfortunately, once grant money is spent, it cannot be reused by 
the foundation.207  North Dakota could expand the use of this money by 
utilizing the L3C. 
If a foundation were to use part of the eight million dollars in grants to 
purchase equity in fledgling businesses that still have a charitable purpose, 
the money would still be used to achieve a social benefit.  The foundation 
could also receive a potential one percent return, and, if or when the busi-
ness becomes self-sufficient, the foundation could redeem its interest or sell 
its interest.208  Thus, the foundation would have the one percent return and 
the value of the equity to reinvest in another L3C or give away in a grant.  
The money achieves a social purpose in both scenarios, but in the latter, the 
money can be recycled to achieve more social good.  The L3C, therefore, 
could serve as a useful tool to increase the amount of money reaching North 
Dakota citizens. 
In 2007, North Dakota grant recipients were awarded grants from not 
only North Dakota foundations, but also from out-of-state foundations.209  
Of the top fifty United States foundations awarding grants in the State of 
North Dakota, North Dakota received 304 grants that totaled 
$18,760,704.210  Over $11 million of the $18,760,704 came from the 
neighboring State of Minnesota.211  In 2007, Minnesota’s foundations had 
assets totaling almost $14 billion and made qualifying distributions of 
nearly $1 billion.212  Because North Dakota L3Cs have the ability to receive 
PRIs from foundations outside the state, North Dakota businesses could 
potentially tap into a large reservoir of capital that could be used for 
charitable purposes.213 
If the L3Cs are able to attract outside PRIs, because of the tranching 
structure, those in the private sector will be more inclined to invest their 
private capital investments.214  The private capital investments, such as pen-
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sions or endowment investments, open the flood gates to money not pres-
ently accessible for socially beneficial investment.215  Opening the doors to 
PRIs and private capital investments means L3Cs could be used in a 
number of ways:  “alternative energy, food bank processing, social services, 
social benefit consulting and media, arts funding, job creation programs, 
economic development, housing for low income and aging populations, 
medical facilities, environmental remediation, and medical research.”216  
L3Cs could bring social benefits and additional resources into the State of 
North Dakota that could do a small part in creating jobs and sparking a 
boost in the local economy.  The potential for benefit surrounding the L3C 
is evident, but it is also important to look at its shortcomings. 
The greatest issue surrounding the L3C is uncertainty.217  The IRS has 
not yet decided “whether a private foundation’s investment in L3C could 
qualify as a program-related investment (PRI) under section 4944(c).”218  
Private foundations will persist in their reluctance to make PRIs in L3Cs 
without receiving regulatory direction from the IRS.219  The IRS, thus, 
creates a large barrier because the essential purpose of starting an L3C, 
which is to gain access to PRIs, is made futile until the IRS blesses the L3C 
as a PRI vehicle.  However, with the growing number of states adopting the 
legislation and 232 L3Cs organized nationwide, there is great optimism that 
the L3C will soon be embraced with open arms, creating a much needed 
fourth sector.220 
V. CONCLUSION 
Returning to the words of Bill Gates, we must “stretch the reach of 
market forces so that more people can make a profit, or at least make a 
living, serving people who are suffering from the worst inequities.”221  
Vermont’s adoption of L3C legislation is a step in the right direction toward 
achieving that goal.222  The North Dakota Legislature should follow the 
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lead of other states, such as Vermont, Michigan, and Illinois, and keep an 
open mind to the new L3C legislation.223  By adopting the L3C legislation, 
North Dakota can begin combining financial and social bottom lines, 
allowing success to benefit more than just the interest holders.224 
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